Practitioner Perspective on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, Claim Construction, and the Doctrine of Equivalents by Filardi, Edward V. & Baker, Mark D.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 3
2004
Practitioner Perspective on the Law of Inequitable
Conduct, Claim Construction, and the Doctrine of
Equivalents
Edward V. Filardi
Mark D. Baker
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Edward V. Filardi and Mark D. Baker, Practitioner Perspective on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, Claim Construction, and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823 (2004)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol54/iss3/13
THE PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE OF
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:
PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES ON
THE LAW OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT,
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION, AND THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Edward V. Filardit and Mark D. Bakertt
INTRODUCTION
There is surely no greater influence upon a patent litigation
practice than the decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
While the Supreme Court has taken a few key matters for consid-
eration and decision, the Federal Circuit is effectively the court of
last resort for almost all issues dealt with by the patent practitio-
ner, including prosecutors as well as trial counsel. The desire for
greater uniformity in patent law led to the creation of the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982.1 During its brief existence, the
court has begun to clarify black-letter patent law in a variety of
areas, justifying the rationale for the court's creation.2 From a
practitioner's perspective, the court's "clarification" process has
generally enabled better advocacy and counseling of clients.3  But
t Edward V. Filardi is a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
tt Mark D. Baker is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) ("It was just for
the sake of such desirable uniformity that Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases .... ); Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of
the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 67 (1993).
Before the Federal Circuit was created, a definite pro-patent or anti-patent bias existed among
the Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Goldman, supra, at 67. Courts' receptiveness or hostility
towards patentees led to, inter alia, concerns of forum shopping.
2 See Goldman, supra note 1, at 68.
3 But see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IX), 344 F.3d
1359, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., concurring) ("[A]t the pace of these changes in funda-
mental patent law, the noble objective of bringing more certainty to the doctrine of equivalents
nonetheless exacts a price in unintended consequences."). Judge Rader also remarked that "the
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many agree that there is still a long way to go, as the court's view
of the patent law in several important areas is only slowly evolv-
ing, which has caused some concern and frustration.
Clients seek opinions from counsel, which requires an in-
formed and experienced view as to what can reasonably be ex-
pected to occur under given circumstances and what rights can rea-
sonably be relied upon to support a substantial investment of time,
money, and resources. For the patent practitioner, it is vital to be
able to predict with reasonable certainty the scope of patent claims
of interest to the client and the enforceability of those claims.
This Article focuses on the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in
three very important areas of patent law where the court has strug-
gled to settle several issues. We discuss the two key areas which
impact predictability and claim scope: claim construction, a neces-
sary first step in any infringement or validity analysis and which
impacts every aspect of client representation; and the doctrine of
equivalents, including of course the Supreme Court's and Federal
Circuit's decisions in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Ka-
buchiki Co.4  Finally, we will discuss patent enforceability in the
context of inequitable conduct, a defense perhaps all too frequently
asserted by accused infringers.5
I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A. Background
The language of the asserted claims must be construed before
any determination can be made regarding infringement or invalid-
pace of the creation of new rules is itself disrupting the fundamental principle of certainty in the
scope of patent claims." Id. at 1376.
4 (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722 (2002); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabuchiki Co. (Festo IX), 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabuchiki Co. (Festo Vr), 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). Because of this
case's lengthy procedural history, the different Festo decisions are often referred to as Festo I,
Festo H1, etc. The Festo decisions that are discussed in this article will be referred to as Festo
VI, Festo VIII, and Festo IX.
I Although not discussed in detail here, two other developments at the Federal Circuit are
worth noting. In Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nut4ahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d
1336, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the court announced that it will reexamine whether it is appropriate
for a trier of fact to draw an adverse inference regarding willful infringement against an accused
infringer who obtains legal advice but does not produce that advice during discovery, because
the advice is protected by the attorney-client and/or work product privilege. Moreover, in In-
tegra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the court held that
the exemption in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) does not protect infringing activity that is related to the
development of a- new drug product which is not already on the market. The court held that the
safe harbor in section 271 (e)(1) only encompasses drug development activities that are neces-
sary to acquire information for FDA approval of a patented pioneer drug which is already on the
market. Id.
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ity.6 Claim interpretation is a matter of law that is entrusted to the
trial judge and reviewed on appeal using the de novo standard of
review.7 The importance of this determination cannot be empha-
sized enough, since "to decide what the claims mean is nearly al-
ways to decide the case."
8
To interpret claims, a court "should look first to the intrinsic
evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the
specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history."9 The
words in a claim are normally given the ordinary and customary or
"plain" meaning that would be attributed to those words by per-
sons skilled in the relevant art, absent a clear teaching of a differ-
ent meaning within the patent specification or the prosecution his-
tory.10 Moreover, courts can use dictionaries to help determine the
meaning that those skilled in the art would have attributed to a dis-
puted claim term; a practical problem is which dictionary or dic-
tionaries should be used, and what to do when conflicting defini-
tions are found."
If the intrinsic evidence does not resolve the ambiguity re-
garding a disputed claim term, extrinsic evidence (e.g., learned
treatises and expert and inventor testimony) may be relied upon to
"explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and
terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution history.'1
2
Courts, however, may not rely upon such extrinsic evidence "for
the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims,"
or, in essence, their "plain" meaning.13
6 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); see
also Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 (noting patent construction is decided first as a matter of law,
and infringement is then submitted as a question for the finder of fact); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The first step in any invalidity or in-
fringement analysis is claim construction.").
7 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
9 Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.
10 E.g., Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech.
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582.
11 Tex. Digital Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d at 1202.
12 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980.
13 Id. at 981; see also Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1584-85 (stating that reliance on extrin-
sic evidence is improper where the meaning of a disputed term can be determined from the
record itself).
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B. Practitioner Perspectives: Recent Federal Circuit Cases
Presenting Claim Construction Issues
In order to better understand how the Federal Circuit applies
the rules of claim construction to particular sets of facts, the fol-
lowing sections discuss recent cases that involved claim construc-
tion issues.
1. E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp. 14
The proper construction of the term "electronic multi-function
card" was at issue in E-Pass.'5  The asserted claim covered a
method of substituting an electronic multi-function card for vari-
ous credit cards, thus reducing the number of cards that a con-
sumer must carry around. 16 The accused products were personal
digital assistants sold under the "Palm Pilot" trademark.'
7
The district court interpreted the disputed term to mean "a de-
vice having the width and outer dimensions of a standard credit
card," and based its interpretation in part on the credit card indus-
try's standard definition of the term "card."' 8 The district court
reasoned that imposition of the size limitation was proper because
the invention must utilize the existing interface requirements of
check terminals-that is, the invention must fit into an ATM ma-
chine's slot so that its magnetic strip could be read.' 9
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court's claim
construction was incorrect. 20 The panel first noted that the ordi-
nary dictionary meaning of the term "card" did not have any di-
mensional requirements. 2' Next, the court stated that there was no
justification for reading the credit card industry's size limitations
into this term because there was no suggestion in the industry's
standards that they should apply outside the area of credit cards.22
The panel then looked to the specification of the patent-in-suit and
found that the patentee had not given that term a definition that
was different from its ordinary meaning.23 The Federal Circuit
also rejected the lower court's reasoning that imposition of the size
14 343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
15 Id. at 1365.
16 id.
"7 Id. at 1366.
18 Id. The American National Standards Institute set forth length, height, and thickness
dimensions for credit cards in 1971. Id.
'9 Id. at 1369-70.
20 Id. at 1365.
21 Id. at 1367.
22 Id. at 1368.
23 See id. at 1369 (noting that the patentee had expressed a preferred embodiment rather
than a precise definition).
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limitation was necessary in order to effectuate interchangeability
with check terminals, noting that the specification disclosed alter-
natives to the traditional magnetic stripe interface between the card
and machines.24
The Federal Circuit's decision illustrates the potential breadth
that a term such as "card" may receive based on its dictionary
definition, with no suggestion of any size limitation in the specifi-
cation or file history. But it is surely understandable why the dis-
trict court felt it necessary to interpret the disputed term as includ-
ing a dimensional restriction, especially since the invention was
meant to serve as a substitute for multiple credit cards. How could
the patent practitioner have ever, in the E-Pass case, been able to
reasonably predict the Federal Circuit's view?
2. Anchor Wall Systems, Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc.2
5
In Anchor Wall, the parties disputed the proper construction
of the terms "back surface," "protrusion," "mate," and "generally
parallel., 26  The patents-in-suit generally disclosed and claimed
interlocking features of masonry blocks that could be stacked to
form retaining walls that resisted ground pressure without requir-
ing any additional support structure.27
The district court read additional limitations from the written
description and the file history into the plain dictionary meanings
of the terms "back surface," "protrusion," and "mate. 28  On ap-
peal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's claim con-
struction of these terms, and held that the ordinary dictionary
meaning of each term was the proper interpretation. 29  The court
stated that the plain meaning of a claim term should not be
changed based on a statement in the specification or file history
unless the different meaning is clearly and unmistakably set forth
therein.3°
'4 Id. at 1369-70.
- 340 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
26 Id. at 1305.
27 Id. at 1301.
28 Id. at 1307-10. Based on a statement in the specification, the district court interpreted
the "back surface limitation to require a back surface 'spanning the full width of the block."' Id.
at 1307. The district court also interpreted the term "protrusion" to require a central narrow
portion, again based on a statement in the specification. Id. at 1308. Finally, based on both the
specification and file history, the lower court construed the term "mate" to include the following
two limitations: (1) "a close confinement of the protrusion" and the insert; and (2) "an ability to
secure the blocks in place in a forwards and backwards direction." Id. at 1309.
29 Id. at 1307-10. Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the disputed terms have the
following meanings: (1) a "back surface" is "a surface at the back of the block"; (2) a "protru-
sion" is "something that protrudes"; and (3) to "mate" is to "join or fit together." Id. at 1307-09.
'0 Id. at 1306.
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The district court interpreted the term "generally parallel" to
mean parallel throughout.3' It read the word "generally" out of
this term because it felt that parallelism is a mathematical concept
that is either true or false, and therefore there could be no such
thing as "generally parallel. 32 The Federal Circuit reversed this
construction, and held that some amount of deviation from exactly
parallel is the proper interpretation of this term.33 The court noted
that using words of approximation in patent claims is permissi-
ble.3
4
This case illustrates how difficult it can be to decide whether
or not a statement in the file history or specification should limit
the ordinary meaning of a disputed term. In order to limit the plain
meaning of a term, the specification or file history must clearly set
forth a different definition. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's ac-
ceptance here (again) of so-called words of approximation explains
why patent prosecutors frequently use such terms to avoid a strict
boundary to a specified parameter.
3. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.
35
In Cordis, the parties disputed the proper interpretation of the
following language that was present in every asserted claim: "wall
surface having a substantially uniform thickness and a plurality of
slots formed therein., 36  The patents-in-suit claimed balloon-
expandable coronary stents.37
The district court held that the phrase "plurality of slots
formed" was limited to stents "in which the slots are formed by the
removal of the material" from the wall surface. 38 The trial judge
imposed this limitation in part because Figure IA was not included
in the specifications of the patents-in-suit. 39 Figure IA disclosed a
stent whose slots were formed by bending wire, not removing ma-
terial, and was included in the specification of a patent that was the
parent of one of the patents-in-suit.4° Thus, the lower court rea-
soned that the exclusion of Figure IA, which disclosed slots
formed by the non-removal of material, clearly limited the mean-
3' Id. at 1311 (defining "parallel" as "everywhere equal distant").
32 Id. at 1310.
3" Id. at 1311.
34 Id. at 1310-11.
35 339 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
36 Id. at 1356.
" Id. at 1354.
38 Id. at 1356.
31 Id. at 1357-58.
4 Id.
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ing of the disputed term in the patents without that figure to slots
formed solely by removal of material.4'
The Federal Circuit disagreed, and held that the "plurality of
slots" can be formed by means other than by removing material
from a wall surface, such as by constructing the wall with open-
ings already built into it.42 The panel first noted that the plain
meaning of the disputed phrase does not suggest by what process
the slots must be made.43 Next, the court stated that nothing in the
specifications contradicted this plain meaning. 44 The panel held
that Cordis' decision not to include Figure 1A in the patents-in-suit
did not mean that the asserted claims could not encompass slots
created by bending wire (i.e., the non-removal of material).4 5 In-
deed, the Federal Circuit remarked that Cordis probably decided
not to include Figure IA in its subsequent applications because
Figure lA's wall surface was not of substantially uniform thick-
ness, an essential limitation of the patents-in-suit.46 Moreover, the
court held that nothing in the prosecution history showed that the
patentee relied on the method of manufacturing the slots as a
means of distinguishing the invention from the prior art.47
The district court also interpreted the term wall surface having
a "substantially uniform thickness" to require that the thickness of
the wall surface not vary by 0.001 inch or more.48 The trial judge
based this limitation on the patentee's statement, during the reex-
amination of one of the patents-in-suit, that the wall thickness of
the stent disclosed in the Ersek patent varied at different points and
ranged from a minimum of 0.0035 inches to a maximum of 0.0045
inches, a difference of 0.001 inches.49 Based on these statements,
the lower court ruled that the asserted claims did not include wall
surfaces that varied in thickness by 0.001 inch or more.5°
The Federal Circuit reversed this interpretation. It first
noted that the term "substantially" normally means "approxi-
mately," and that, therefore, the ordinary meaning of "wall surface
with a 'substantially uniform thickness"' is that the walls must be
of approximately uniform thickness.52  The court next held that
41 id.
42 Id. at 1356-57.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 1356-60 (construing the claim in part based on the prosecution history).
41 Id. at 1358.
46 id.
47 Id. at 1358-60.
41 Id. at 1360.
49 Id. at 1360-61.
'o Id. at 1360.
" id. at 1362.
52 Id. at 1360-61 (quoting Antonsson Aft. 1 10).
2004]
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there had not been a "clear and unmistakable disclaimer" based on
the patentee's remarks regarding the Ersek patent.53 It also noted
that Cordis did not distinguish the Ersek patent because the walls
of that patent varied in thickness.54 Instead, Cordis distinguished
that reference because "Ersek's walls were at least twice as thick
at the intersections of [the] strands as along the strands them-
selves. 5  The panel held that, at best, the patentee's statements
were ambiguous, and as such could not constitute a "clear and un-
mistakable disclaimer.,
56
Here, again, the Federal Circuit refused to read any limita-
tions into the claims from the specification or prosecution history
absent a clear directive to do so. As explained above, even an am-
biguous statement by a patentee does not limit the claims. The
disclaimer or different definition must be clearly set forth in the
specification or file history. The problems that Cordis encountered
because of its remarks regarding the Ersek patent should motivate
patent prosecutors to exercise care in what is said regarding prior
art references in order to avoid an adverse impact on claim inter-
pretation, as well as infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.
4. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA
57
In Integra, the parties disputed the meaning of the term "pep-
tide. 58  The invention disclosed and claimed short peptide se-
quences that promoted cell adhesion to substrates in culture and in
vivo, and had the clinical potential to promote wound healing and
biocompatibility of prosthetic devices. 59
Merck, the accused infringer, argued that the district court
erred in construing the term peptide to embrace both linear and
cyclic peptides. 6° It noted that the patents-in-suit did not expressly
refer to cyclic configurations.61 Moreover, Merck contended that a
statement made by the patentee during the prosecution of an unre-
lated application-that some of the patents-in-suit did not teach
cyclic peptides-further justified limiting the term peptide to only
linear peptides.62
"3 Id. at 1361.
4 id.
55 id.
56 id.
57 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
51 Id. at 868.
59 Id. at 862-63.
60 Id. at 868.
61 id.
62 Id. at 868-69.
[Vol. 54:3
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation
and rejected both of Merck's arguments. 63 It first noted that the
ordinary meaning of the term peptide "encompasses peptides of
differing structural forms." 64 The court also stated that the specifi-
cations embrace both cyclic and linear forms, despite the fact that
the patents did not expressly refer to cyclic peptides.65 Moreover,
the court rejected Merck's attempt to exclude cyclic forms based
on the patentee's statement that certain of the patents-in-suit do
not teach cyclic peptides. 66 The court noted that there was no basis
in law to limit the asserted claims because the remark was made
during the prosecution of an application unrelated to any of the
patents-in-suit. 67 Further, the court held that the alleged "admis-
sion" was ambiguous at best, and presumably did not evidence a
clear disavowal of claim scope.68
This case illustrates the breadth often given to claim terms
based on their ordinary meaning to persons skilled in the art.
Here, the fact that the specifications did not mention cyclic pep-
tides was of no moment because Integra introduced evidence that
those skilled in the art knew that the claimed peptide sequences
existed on cyclic peptides.
C. Practitioner Perspectives: The Axiom That Courts Should
Construe Claims to Preserve Their Validity
The axiom that claims should be construed, if possible, to sus-
tain their validity is well-settled.69 However, "if the only claim
construction that is consistent with the claim's language and the
written description renders the claim invalid, then the axiom does
not apply and the claim is simply invalid. 7°
Surprisingly, this axiom is often relied upon by accused in-
fringers to limit the potential breadth of claim terms during Mark-
man determinations. In Karsten Manufacturing Corp. v. Cleveland
Golf Co. ,71 the Federal Circuit described the opposing arguments
63 Id.
Id. at 868.
65 id.
66 Id. at 869.
67 id.
68 id.
69 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[T]he claims are not properly construed to have a meaning or scope that would lead to their
invalidity for failure to satisfy the requirements of patentability."); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183
F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[C]laims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain
their validity.").
70 Rhine, 183 F.3d at 1345.
71 242 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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that patentees and accused infringers typically assert which impli-
cate this axiom:
The jurisprudence of claim construction reflects the difficult
balance between a patentee's exhortation that courts should
read claims broadly and unlimited to the specific embodi-
ments shown in the specification, and the rule that claims
should be construed sufficiently narrowly to preserve their
validity. In counterpart, an accused infringer often argues, as
in this case, that if the claims are read sufficiently broadly as
to reach the accused device, the claims also read on the prior
art and are invalid.72
Moreover, an accused infringer may also argue that a pat-
entee's proposed (broad) construction of a term renders a claim
invalid because under that interpretation the claim would fail to
satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Therefore, a two-pronged argument that a claim should be
construed (narrowly) to preserve its validity or that a claim is inva-
lid under a patentee's proposed (broad) interpretation is often a
powerful weapon in an accused infringer's arsenal. These com-
plimentary arguments are frequently asserted in litigation and pro-
vide an excellent way to limit the potential breadth given to a dis-
puted term. On the other hand, a patentee can possibly defeat this
attack on the breadth of its claims by arguing that the invalidity
concerns are unclear or prematurely considered at the claim con-
struction stage.74
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A patentee can prove infringement either literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement of a claim exists
"when the properly construed claim reads on the accused device
exactly."'75 Conversely, an accused device that does not literally
infringe may still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if each
limitation not already literally present in an accused device is
72 Id. at 1384.
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Wang Labs., Inc., 197 F.3d at 1383 (affirming the district
court's decision to limit the term "frame" to only cover character-based protocols because the
requirements of section 112 were not met as to other protocols); Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome
Found., Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming the lower court's decision to
construe a disputed term narrowly because the patentee's other proposed interpretations were
"hopelessly overbroad" and raised enablement, written description, and definiteness concerns).
74 See, e.g., Rhine, 183 F.3d at 1346 (rejecting as premature the accused infringers' argu-
ment that a proposed construction renders a claim obvious).
75 Strattec Sec. Corp. v. Gen. Auto. Specialty Co., 126 F.3d 1411, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
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equivalently present in that device. 76  Thus, pursuant to the doc-
trine of equivalents the scope of a patent is not limited to its literal
terms because it also embraces all equivalents to the claims de-
scribed.77
This doctrine was developed to prevent avoiding infringement
by making insubstantial changes to a patented invention. 78 The
"triple identity" test is one that has been developed to determine
equivalency between a claimed element and an accused product or
process. 79 Because the issues of infringement and equivalence are
questions of fact normally tried to a jury, the doctrine of equiva-
lents can be a very powerful weapon for patentees.80
In an effort to ensure a reasonable and equitable application of
the doctrine of equivalents, numerous checks on its appropriate-
ness have developed over time. Limitations on the doctrine, in-
cluding estoppel, the all elements rule, and dedication of un-
claimed matter, have received recent attention from the Federal
Circuit.
A. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel "can occur as a result of (i)
amendments made to overcome patentability rejections or (ii) ar-
guments made during prosecution that show 'a clear and unmistak-
able surrender of subject matter.' 8' The former form of estoppel,
which is based on claim amendments, has been the subject of
76 Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
7 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabuchiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 722,
732 (2002) (stating that literal patent interpretation would enable unsubstantial substitutes to
defeat a patent, thus defeating the value of the patent to inventors).
78 Id. at 731 ("[Ilf patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would
be greatly diminished.").
79 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997); see also
MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.3 (1998) (stating that either literal infringement or
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents must be present in a claim). This test compares
the claimed element and accused product (or process), and looks at whether or not there are
substantial differences between the functions served by each, the way that each serve that func-
tion, and the result obtained by each. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39. If the differences
are insubstantial, the claimed element is equivalently present in the accused product or process.
Id.
80 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Mayer, C.J.,
concurring) ("To determine the scope of such equivalents, the district court must resolve ques-
tions of fact by resorting to the expertise of the fact finder."); Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates,
Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Equivalency is a question of fact, and findings
thereon are reviewed for clear error."); Strattec Sec. Corp., 126 F.3d at 1416 ("A determination
of whether the properly construed claims encompass the accused structure "is a question of fact,
to be submitted to a jury.").
81 Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quot-
ing Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 828 & 828 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
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much controversy in recent years.82  It limits the doctrine of
equivalents by denying a patentee any equivalents to a claim limi-
tation whose scope was narrowed during prosecution for reasons
related to patentability.83 This form of estoppel thus "requires that
the claims of a patent be interpreted in light of the proceedings in
the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office] during the application
process.,,84  The Supreme Court described the rationale behindamendment-based estoppel as follows:
A rejection indicates that the patent examiner does not be-
lieve the original claim could be patented. While the pat-
entee has the right to appeal, his decision to forgo an appeal
and submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that
the invention as patented does not reach as far as the original
claim. . . .Were it otherwise, the inventor might avoid the
PTO's gatekeeping role and seek to recapture in an infringe-
ment action the very subject matter surrendered as a condi-
tion of receiving the patent. 85
The test for determining whether there is estoppel is as fol-
lows. First, there must have been a limiting amendment during the
prosecution of the patent.86  If there was a limiting amendment,
then a court must look at why the patentee amended the claim to
add the limitation, because estoppel only applies to amendments
that were made for a substantial reason related to patentability.87
The burden is on the patentee to explain why the amendment was
not related to patentability.88 In other words, if the patentee fails
to explain why an amendment was not substantially related to pat-
entability, then a court must presume that it was. 89 In order to re-
inforce the public notice function served by the prosecution history
record, a patentee may only rely upon that record to rebut the
Warner-Jenkinson presumption that an amendment was made for a
reason related to patentability. 90 Assuming that the patentee fails
to explain why the amendment was not related to patentability, he
or she may be estopped from asserting infringement of the
82 Because the following sections discuss only amendment-based estoppel, the subsequent
use of the term "prosecution history estoppel" refers only to amendment-based estoppel, unless
otherwise indicated.
83 Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
84 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VII), 535 U.S. 722, 733
(2002).
85 Id. at 734.
86 Pioneer Magnetics, Inc., 330 F.3d at 1356.
87 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1997).
88 Id.
89 id.
90 Pioneer Magnetics, Inc., 330 F.3d at 1356.
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amended limitation under the doctrine of equivalents. 9' The scope
of that estoppel, i.e., what range of equivalents, if any, is still
available, is the subject of the following sections.
1. Recent Developments: The Supreme Court's Decision in Festo
VIII
In Festo VIII, the Supreme Court considered the proper scope
of prosecution history estoppel and what types of narrowing
amendments might give rise to that estoppel. 92 The Court's deci-
sion in Festo VIII was widely anticipated within the patent com-
munity because of the Federal Circuit's controversial decision be-
low in Festo VI. Two main issues were presented at both levels of
appellate review.
a. What Narrowing Amendments Give Rise to Estoppel
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the
Supreme Court stated that prosecution history estoppel would ap-
ply to any limiting amendment that "had a substantial reason re-
lated to patentability. 93  Although the Court clearly implied that
amendments to avoid prior art rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or
obviousness rejections under section 103 would be substantially
related to patentability, it did not define that term or catalog every
reason that might raise any estoppel issue.94 Thus, the applicabil-
ity of prosecution history estoppel to other limiting amendments,
for example those made to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, was un-
clear.95
In Festo VI, an en banc Federal Circuit tried to answer this
question. It held that an amendment that narrows the scope of a
claim for "any reason related to the statutory requirements for a
patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel. 96  Thus, no
longer was prosecution history estoppel limited to amendments
that were made to overcome prior art rejections under sections 102
and 103, but estoppel would also now apply to narrowing amend-
ments that were made to satisfy other patentability requirements,
such as those under section 112. The Federal Circuit further held
91 Id. at 1356-57.
92 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VILI), 535 U.S. 722,
735-41 (2002).
93 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
94 Id. at 30-33 (stating that it saw no substantial reason to upset the current role).
95 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558,
566-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (stating that there are numerous statutory requirements that
must be met before the issuance of a patent, and thus that relate to patentability).
96 Id. at 563.
97 Id. at 566-67 (35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the patent application describe, enable and
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that voluntary claim amendments would be given the same effect
as amendments that were required by the PTO, thus establishing
that both types of amendments could give rise to estoppel.98
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that "a
narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Pat-
ent Act may give rise to an estoppel." 99 The Court reasoned that
the enablement, best mode, and written description requirements in
section 112 must be satisfied before an application will be allowed
to issue as a patent.' °° Thus, a limiting amendment made to com-
ply with section 112's requirements clearly is substantially related
to patentability.''
b. What Is the Scope of the Estoppel?
The most controversial part of the Federal Circuit's decision
in Festo VI was its holding that prosecution history estoppel is a
complete per se bar against any range of equivalents for a nar-
rowed claim element. 102 In other words, the Federal Circuit estab-
lished a bright-line rule that the scope of the estoppel for a nar-
rowed claim element would be total, and that the narrowed element
must be limited to its strict literal terms. 0 3 Prior to Festo VI, two
divergent lines of Federal Circuit cases answered this question dif-
ferently. One line of cases followed a strict approach of complete
surrender and limited the patentee to no equivalents based on the
estoppel, while the other line of cases adopted a flexible bar ap-
proach.°4 The court reasoned that the new complete bar approach
best served the notice function of the claims and reduced the pub-
lic's need to speculate as to the subject matter surrendered by an
amendment.10 5
The Supreme Court rejected this bright line rule, and held that
a determination of the scope of estoppel requires an examination
of the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment,
i.e., it must be done on a case-by-case basis.0 6 Under the frame-
work established by the Supreme Court, courts must now presume
set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention, and also requires that the subject matter of
the invention be described).
98 Id. at 568.
99 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo V1II), 535 U.S. 722, 736
(2002).
I00d.
101 Id. at 735-37.
,02 Festo VI, 234 F.3d at 569.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 573.
05 lid. at 576-77.
106See Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 737-41 (stating that a per se rule prevents an inquiry into
and examination of the subject matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment).
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that a patentee surrendered the particular equivalent in question if
he or she made a narrowing amendment for a purpose relating to
patentability. 0 7 The patentee can rebut this presumption if he or
she can show that "at the time of the amendment one skilled in the
art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that
would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent." ' 8 The
Court provided some examples of situations where an estoppel
should not be found:
There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent.
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of
the application; the rationale underlying the amendment may
bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in
question; or there may be some other reason suggesting that
the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have de-
scribed the insubstantial substitute in question)
°9
2. Recent Developments: The Federal Circuit's Decision in Festo IX
on Remand from the Supreme Court
The Federal Circuit recently issued a decision in Festo IX af-
ter the Supreme Court remanded that case. The sole issue before
the court was whether Festo, the patentee, could rebut the pre-
sumption that it lost all equivalents between the original and
amended claim limitations. 10 The Federal Circuit considered the
three examples that the Supreme Court set forth by which a pat-
entee might rebut this presumption, and explained the types of evi-
dence that may be considered for each."' The court held that, as
applied to the facts at hand, Festo could not rebut the presumption
by arguing that the narrowing amendments bore no more than a
tangential relation to the accused equivalents or that there was
some other reason that it could not reasonably have been expected
to describe the accused equivalents. 1 2 The court did, however,
remand the case to the district court to allow Festo to rebut the
presumption by showing that the equivalents would have been un-
107 Id. at 740.
108 Id. at 741.
1091d. at 740-41.
Jo0Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IX), 344 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
11 Id. at 1368-70.
1121d. at 1363.
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foreseeable to one of ordinary skill at the time of the amend-
ments. 1
13
The Federal Circuit first held that rebuttal of the presumption
of surrender is a question of law to be decided by a court. 114 Even
though rebuttal of that presumption may be subject to underlying
facts, the Federal Circuit felt that lower courts could properly re-
solve these facts in making the ultimate determination as a matter
of law regarding estoppel.' 1
5
The court then considered the three ways identified by the Su-
preme Court whereby a patentee may overcome the presumption
that it surrendered the scope of equivalents between the original
and amended claim limitations." 6 Even though it declined to dis-
cuss the relevant factors encompassed by each of the rebuttal crite-
ria, the court did provide some general guidance. 117
The court first addressed the rebuttal criterion that allows a
patentee to show that an alleged equivalent would have been "un-
foreseeable at the time of the amendment and thus beyond a fair
interpretation of what was surrendered."'" 8 It stated that this "pre-
sents an objective inquiry, asking whether the alleged equivalent
would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the amendment."" 9 Because this inquiry depends on
underlying factual issues relating to the state of the art and the un-
derstanding of a person ordinarily skilled in the art, the Federal
Circuit noted that lower courts may hear expert testimony and con-
sider extrinsic evidence as to these issues.
120
The court next considered the criterion that requires a patentee
to show that "the rationale underlying the narrowing amendment
[bore] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in ques-
tion."' 121 It remarked that the plain meaning of this inquiry is
"whether the reason for the narrowing amendment was peripheral,
or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent."'122 Importantly,
the court noted that only the prosecution history record may be
used by a patentee to prove the reason for the amendment. 123 Ex-
13Id. at 1364.
114 d, at 1368.
"5Id. The court noted that judges consider underlying factual issues in the area of claim
construction, which is also a matter of law to be determined by a court. Id. at 1368 n.3.
1161d. at 1368-70.
1 71d.
18 1Id. at 1369 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo
vm), 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002)).
1191d.
120Id.
121 Id. (quoting Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 740).
122 Id.
123 Id.
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trinsic evidence should only be considered, as necessary, to help
interpret that record.1
24
Finally, the court considered the third criterion that requires a
patentee to show "some other reason suggesting that the patentee
could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstan-
tial substitute in question."' 125 While noting that this category must
be narrow, the court said that it may be satisfied "when there was
some reason, such as the shortcomings of language, why the pat-
entee was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when
it narrowed the claim."'' 26 The court also stated that determination
of this criterion should be limited to the prosecution history record,
although it left open the possibility that evidence outside that re-
cord may be considered in this inquiry. 1
27
3. Practitioner Perspectives: The Impact of Festo VI, VIII, and IX
The Supreme Court's decision was a victory for patentees be-
cause it reversed the complete bar established by the Federal Cir-
cuit. In theory, some range of equivalents between the originally
claimed element and the narrowed element should be available. In
reality, the rebuttable presumption that a patentee surrendered all
equivalents will make it very difficult to capture any equivalents
beyond the literal scope of the amended claim element when the
reason for the amendment was not explained.
Because the determination of prosecution history estoppel is a
matter of law for courts to determine, 128 courts may make pretrial
determinations regarding whether there is estoppel, and if so, what
the scope of that estoppel is. 129 These determinations can be made
in the context of a Markman ruling or motion for partial summary
judgment. 30 There is no doubt, however, that pretrial resolution of
the estoppel issue will enhance judicial economy.
Finally, there is the issue of what types of evidence a patentee
should use to rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of
equivalence. The Federal Circuit's decision in Festo IX implies
that a patentee can only establish the second and third criteria by
124 Id. at 1370.
2 Id. (quoting Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 741).
126 Id.
127Id
.
128 See Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (explaining that prosecution history estoppel is a question of law reviewed by the courts).
'
2 9 See John M. Benassi & Kurt M. Kjelland, Still Not the Same As It Ever Was... Prov-
ing Infringement After the Supreme Court's Festo Decision, in PATENT LITIGATION 2002, at
253, 298-300 (PLI Intellectual Property, Handbook Series No. 721, 2002).
130 See id.
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using the prosecution history record. 131 Although leaving open the
possibility that extrinsic evidence may be used to prove these ex-
amples, the general rule established by the court will make these
examples hard to establish. 132 Because the Federal Circuit did al-
low for extrinsic and expert testimony regarding whether the al-
leged equivalent was unforeseeable, this category should be easier
to establish. 1
33
Because the holdings in all the Festo decisions apply retroac-
tively, there is little that can be done to resolve problems with is-
sued patents. 34 There are, however, several measures that prose-
cutors can take to help their clients avoid any estoppel with respect
to future patents. Attorneys can draft and file claims that are rea-
sonable in scope in view of the disclosure, avoiding broad claim
language that is difficult to support under section 1 12.135 The plain
objective is to avoid the need for limiting amendments. 36 More-
over, the need to file narrowing amendments might be avoided if
the application includes many independent claims of varying
breadth-that is, claims over the entire spectrum. 37  Here, one
would hope that at least one of the claims would be unobjection-
able, and thus issue without having to be amended.
In the event that an amendment must be made, the attorney
should take several steps to minimize the effect of that amend-
ment. The prosecutor should make clear what elements are being
amended, since estoppel will only be found for those elements that
are narrowed. 38 One can separate the different elements by semi-
colons, for example, to clearly illustrate what elements have been
amended. 139 Moreover, an attorney should also explain the reason
for making an amendment, and clearly describe what subject mat-
ter, if any, is being relinquished.140
131 See Festo IX, 344 F.3d at 1370 ("When at all possible, determination of the third rebu-
table criterion should also be limited to the prosecution history record.").
1
3 2 Id.
1
3 3 Id. at 1369.
134 Id. at 1370 n.4 ("Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the holdings of that Court
and our own regarding the Festo presumption of surrender and its rebuttal apply to all granted
patents and to all pending litigation that has not been concluded with a final judgment, including
appeals.").
135 Benassi & Kjelland, supra note 129, at 306.
136See id. (noting that the narrower the claim, the more likely it is that the examiner will
allow it without requiring additional amendments).
137 Id.
138 See id. at 306-07.
13 9 Id.
40 Id. at 311.
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B. The All Elements Rule
The all elements rule serves as another check upon the doc-
trine of equivalents. Under this rule, "there can be no infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents if even one element of a
claim or its equivalent is not present in the accused device."' 4' In
other words, every claim element must be present in the accused
device either literally or equivalently, because the doctrine of
equivalents must be applied to the individual elements of the
claim, not the invention as a whole. 142 Therefore, "if a court de-
termines that a finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents 'would entirely vitiate a particular claim element,'
then that court should rule that there is no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents." 43
Practically speaking, the all elements rule is another powerful
weapon that accused infringers can use to combat the doctrine of
equivalents. It prevents the patentee, in essence, from removing
limitations from the claims during the equivalency analysis. If
presented with a situation where a claim element is undisputedly
not present in the accused device, then no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is possible. 144 Moreover, the Federal Cir-
cuit recently indicated that it may rely upon the all elements rule to
decide cases that were remanded to that court after the Supreme
Court decided Festo VIII.
145
C. Public Dedication of Unclaimed but Disclosed Equivalents
In Johnson & Johnson Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co.,
146
the Federal Circuit considered whether or not a patentee may cap-
ture, under the doctrine of equivalents, an unclaimed equivalent
that was nonetheless disclosed in the patent. 47 The patentee's in-
vention was an assembly that prevented damage during assembly
of printed circuit boards. 148 Part of that assembly included a pro-
tective substrate. 49 Although the specification stated that many
141 Bell At. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258,
1279 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
142 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
43 Bell Ad. Network Servs., Inc., 262 F.3d at 1279-80 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VI), 234 F.3d 558, 587 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
144Id. at 1279.
145 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1320-21 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (noting that the scope of the claim limitations have been proscribed by the all ele-
ments rule).
1- 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
14 7 Id. at 1052.
48Id. at 1048-49.
149Id. at 1049.
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metals, including steel, may be used as the protective substrate, the
claims only covered aluminum.1 50  Because the accused product
used steel as the substrate, Johnson & Johnson argued that steel
was equivalent to aluminum, and therefore infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents.1
51
The patentee and accused infringers in Johnson & Johnson
argued that divergent lines of Federal Circuit case law supported
their respective positions. 52 The accused infringers relied upon
the court's decision in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,' 53 where the court
noted the established rule that "subject matter disclosed but not
claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public.' 54
Johnson & Johnson argued that the Federal Circuit's decision in
YBM Magnex, Inc. v. International Trade Commission155 con-
trolled, where the court stated that Maxwell did not create a new
rule of law that the doctrine of equivalents could never encompass
subject matter disclosed but not claimed. 156
After hearing the case en banc, the Federal Circuit held that
Johnson & Johnson could not invoke the doctrine of equivalents to
extend its aluminum limitation to cover steel, since it disclosed but
did not claim steel substrates. 57 Thus, whenever "a patent drafter
discloses but declines to claim subject matter, this action dedicates
that unclaimed matter to the public."1 58 The court reasoned that its
decision would benefit the public because it would be able to bet-
ter predict which equivalents inventions might encompass. 159
Moreover, the court's result was based on the notion that a pat-
entee has an obligation to draft claims that capture all reasonably
foreseeable ways of practicing his or her invention.' 6° Finally, the
Federal Circuit also overruled YBM Magnex to the extent that it
conflicted with the court's current holding.
61
The result in Johnson & Johnson therefore provides yet an-
other defense to accused infringers against infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. Patent prosecutors will now be well-
lM0ld, at 1049-50.
15 1 Id. at 1050-51.
152Id. at 1051.
153 86 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
15id. at 1106 (quoting Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
155 145 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
56Id. at 1322.
157 Johnson & Johnson Assoc., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1055.
158 Id. at 1054.
59Id. at 1056-57 (Rader, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 1055.
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advised to make sure that they claim every manner of practicing
the invention that is disclosed in the specification.
IiI. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A. Background
Inequitable conduct can result in the unenforceability of a pat-
ent right when certain individuals associated with a patent's prose-
cution violate a duty of candor by intentionally disclosing, failing
to disclose, or misrepresenting certain material information to the
PTO. 62 Every patent applicant has "a duty to disclose information
that is material to the patentability of an invention."'163 "A breach
of this duty can take several forms: 'an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion of a material fact, a failure to disclose material information, or
submission of false, material information.
' ''1 64
Based upon a recent Federal Circuit ruling in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the test for establishing
inequitable conduct now involves in essence a three-part analysis.
The party asserting the defense must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the patent applicant failed to disclose or misrepre-
sented "material" information to the PTO, and second, that this
was done with an intent to deceive or mislead the PTO.165
Once a party makes the initial threshold showings of material-
ity and intent, the court must then weigh the materiality and intent
in light of all the circumstances and make a discretionary judgment
regarding whether or not the patent should be rendered unenforce-
able.1 66 In other words, a district court "must determine whether
the equities warrant a conclusion that the patentee has engaged in
inequitable conduct."' 167 In making this equitable determination
and in weighing the degrees of materiality and intent, the showing
of intent can be proportionally less when balanced against high
materiality. 168 As alluded to above, a party who breaches its duty
of candor, i.e., commits inequitable conduct, forfeits its right under
any resulting patents in part because the party's conduct harms
both the PTO and the public.169
162 Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and Recom-
mended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 845-46 (1999).
1
63 
Id. at 846.
164Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 326 F.3d 1226, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
165 Id.
166ld. at 1234.
167 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
168Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 326 F.3d at 1234.
16 9 See Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1383
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The Federal Circuit reviews a lower court's findings of fact
regarding materiality and intent for clear error, and reviews the
ultimate determination of inequitable conduct under an abuse of
discretion standard.1
70
With such a three-part test, and particularly with the element
of "balancing the equities," how does a patent practitioner rea-
sonably opine on patent enforceability?
B. A Brief History of Inequitable Conduct at the Federal Circuit
Early in its history, the Federal Circuit "showed itself quite
willing to substitute its assessment of the equities of a case for that
of the trial court."' 71 Because of this, the number of inequitable
conduct defenses raised in patent infringement suits rose signifi-
cantly, prompting Senior Circuit Judge Nichols to remark that "the
habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent
case has become an absolute plague."' 172 At that time, the Federal
Circuit viewed the ultimate question of whether inequitable con-
duct had occurred as a question of law, making appeal of this issue
more attractive to accused infringers because of the less deferential
standard of review.
173
Realizing that the standard of review was exacerbating the
problem, in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister
Inc. 174 an en banc Federal Circuit held that it would hereinafter
review inequitable conduct determinations using an abuse of dis-
cretion standard.175 In an apparent attempt to further discourage
future parties from raising this issue on appeal, the court remarked
that "[w]e, accordingly, will not simply substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court in relation to inequitable conduct."' 1
76
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
170 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 326 F.3d at 1234.
171 Goldman, supra note 1, at 85.
172 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
17 Goldman, supra note 1, at 85; see Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1363 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the "but it may have" inquiry); see also In re
Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 890 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that a balancing test is required for deter-
mining if inequitable conduct exists).
1- 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
175Id. at 876. The court relied upon the doctrine's equitable roots to justify the standard of
review that it adopted. Id.
17
6 Id.
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C. Practitioner Perspectives: Attractiveness of the
Inequitable Conduct Defense
Patent suits typically involve issues that are highly technical
and possibly difficult for jurors and/or judges to understand. 177
The defense of inequitable conduct, however, does not center on
issues of technology, but instead focuses on human conduct and
motivation. 78 Given these facts, it is not surprising that practitio-
ners favor raising the inequitable conduct defense because it is less
technologically complex, more emotional, and presumably more
comprehensible to the fact finder. 79 This tactic is sometimes re-
ferred to as a "try the person rather than the patent" strategy.
80
D. Practitioner Perspectives: Materiality Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
The rules promulgated by the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks set forth, inter alia, standards of conduct for patent
attorneys and agents prosecuting patent applications before the
PTO. 181 Specifically, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 ("Rule 56") states that
"[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing
with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to patent-
ability."1 82  That rule also defines when information is "material"
to patentability, and further defines who is "associated with the
filing or prosecution of a patent application" and is therefore under
a duty to disclose material information.
1 83
Although Rule 56 "binds anyone practicing before the PTO, it
does not control a court's determination of whether inequitable
conduct has occurred."' 184 Specifically, the definition of material-
177 Kenneth R. Adamo, Recent Developments in Inequitable Conduct/The (Statutory) Duty
of Disclosure/"Fraud" on the P.T.O., 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 110, 119 (1991).
Although the trial judge makes the ultimate determination on the inequitable conduct issue, a
jury can function in an advisory role. Id. ("Where a jury is demanded, it is usual to let it func-
tion in an advisory capacity as to that issue, with its finding providing basis for the trial judge's
ruling.").
178 Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent Pro-
curement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest Reform,
13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 279 (1997).
179 Adamo, supra note 177, at 119.
180 Chisum, supra note 178, at 279.
181 Glenn E. Von Tersch, Curing the Inequitable Conduct Plague in Patent Litigation, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 423-24 (1998).
182 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2002).
183 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)-(c) (2002).
184 Von Tersch, supra note 181, at 425.
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ity in Rule 56 is only an "appropriate starting point for any discus-
sion of materiality, for it appears to be the broadest."1
85
Around the time that the Federal Circuit was deciding to
change the applicable standard of review in Kingsdown, the patent
bar "engaged in a concerted effort to change the standard of mate-
riality to make the inequitable conduct defense more difficult to
assert." 186 That effort "culminated in a major revision of Rule 56
that took effect in March 1992.,, 187 The pre-March 1992 version of
Rule 56 provided, in pertinent part, that "information is material
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the ap-
plication to issue as a patent."'' 88 The post-March 1992 version of
Rule 56 provides, inter alia, that:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumu-
lative to information already of record or being made of re-
cord in the application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a
claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the appli-
cant takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied
on by the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentablity1 89
If the new definition of material information in revised Rule
56 is adopted by the courts, then the corresponding narrower duty
to disclose should make the defense of inequitable conduct more
difficult to establish. 90 In fact, many people felt that "the PTO is
using its new rule to exhort the Federal Circuit to adopt a particu-
lar legal definition of inequitable conduct."' 91 Many commentators
debated the issue of whether or not the change in Rule 56 would
work a corresponding change in the law of inequitable conduct.192
185 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
186 Goldman, supra note 1, at 88.
187 Id.
18837 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1991).
189 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2002).
190 Anderson, supra note 162, at 864-65.
191 R. Carl Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 257, 277 (1992).
192See id. at 259 (noting both sides of the debate and concluding that the change would
likely not work a corresponding change in the law of inequitable conduct). Compare Anderson,
supra note 162, at 894 ("The courts should welcome the new standard for inequitable conduct,
which offers a narrower standard."), with Chisum, supra note 178, at 296 ("[I]t is not certain
that the courts will adopt the altered PTO Rule 56 standard for the inequitable conduct defense,
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Unfortunately, the effect of Rule 56's change on the law of
inequitable conduct remains unclear. The Federal Circuit's clear-
est statement on this issue came in Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc.' 93 In Dayco, three of the patents-in-suit were
filed and prosecuted after the 1992 revision to Rule 56 came into
effect. 194 The district court decided the case under the post-1992
standard of materiality. 195
The Federal Circuit struggled with what effect, if any, the
change in Rule 56 has on the applicable standard for inequitable
conduct. 196 The court stated that it "has not decided whether it
should adhere to the preexisting standard for inequitable conduct
in prosecutions occurring after the effective date of the new [PTO]
rule."'197 The court did note, however, that its power to declare
patents unenforceable because of inequitable conduct is founded in
equity, not the PTO's regulations, thus suggesting that the change
to Rule 56's definition of materiality would not effectuate a similar
change in the test for inequitable conduct. 198 Ultimately, the
Dayco court avoided directly answering the question regarding
what effect, if any, revised Rule 56 has on the standard for materi-
ality in inequitable conduct cases. 199 Instead, the court held that
the result of the appeal would be the same under either materiality
standard. 200 The panel's reluctance to affirmatively restrict the
inequitable conduct analysis to revised Rule 56's definition of ma-
teriality is harmonious with an earlier statement by the Federal
Circuit that revised Rule 56 "was not intended to constitute a sig-
nificant substantive break with the previous standard., 20 1
From a practitioner's perspective, the Federal Circuit's reluc-
tance to affirmatively endorse any one definition of materiality
compels certain precautionary measures. For example, one should
make all materiality determinations and arguments, both in prose-
cution and during litigation, under both pre- and post-1992 materi-
which the courts recognized long before the adoption of the Rule 56 duty of candor in 1977.").
193 29 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
194Id. at 1364.
195 Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132-33 (W.D.
Mo. 2002).
196 Dayco Prods., Inc., 329 F.3d at 1364.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1364 n.3 ("The court's authority to render a patent unenforceable for inequitable
conduct is founded in the equitable principle that 'he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands."' (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814 (1945)).
199Id. at 1364.
20 Id.
201 Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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ality standards. 0 2 Furthermore, should the different definitions of
materiality somehow create confusion regarding whether there is a
duty to disclose certain information, the applicant should err on the
side of disclosure.0 3
E. Practitioner Perspectives: Material Misrepresentations
Concerning "Completed" Test Results
In the recent case of Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega
Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of inequitable con-
duct based on, inter alia, misrepresentations by the patentees con-
cerning a purification protocol that was never performed, but was
described using the past tense, indicating that the experiment had
been conducted. 20 4  The implications of this decision are wide-
ranging, especially in the context of biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical patents, because examples (i.e., experiments) are fre-
quently included in patents in these fields.
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the inventors represented to the PTO
that they had (1) performed a certain experimental protocol (Ex-
ample VI) to purify an enzyme; and (2) obtained certain results as
a result of that experiment. 20 5 In fact, the applicants had not per-
formed that experiment even though it was written in the past
206tense. Moreover, the inventors argued for patentability in part
based on the "results" of this experiment, when, in reality, they
lacked sufficient evidence to substantiate their assertion.0 7 The
district court found inequitable conduct on these facts.20 8
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed this ground on which
the district court found inequitable conduct.209  The court found
that such past tense language created a misrepresentation, in that
"a reader of the patent would conclude that the ... [results de-
scribed] were actually achieved. ' 2t0 In examining the use of the
past tense in light of the knowledge that the tests had never actu-
ally been conducted as represented, the Federal Circuit concluded
202 Douglas R. Nemec, Current Trends in Equitable Defenses to Patent Infringement:
Prosecution Laches and Inequitable Conduct, in PATENT LrrIGATION 2003, at 1035, 1075-77
(PLI Intellectual Property, Handbook Series No. 766, 2003).
203 See, e.g., Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1193 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Magnavox Co., 707 F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
204 323 F.3d 1354, 1363-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
20 1d. at 1363.
2Old. at 1364.
o7 Id. at 1364-68.
20 d. at 1363.
209 Id. at 1372. The Federal Circuit felt compelled to vacate the order of unenforceability
and remand the case because the trial judge failed to expressly address the third step of the
inequitable conduct analysis. Id.
2101d. at 1364.
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that the patentees' misrepresentations were material and inten-
tional. 2 ''
As alluded to above, the implications of this decision are great
to those practitioners who frequently include examples or experi-
ments in patent applications. Specifically, a prosecuting attorney
must take several steps to avoid providing an accused infringer
with an inequitable conduct defense based on "completed" tests.
Initially, the attorney must make sure that all of the experiments
disclosed in the specification have been performed. If this is not
the case, the attorney must make sure that the present tense is used
to describe those experiments that have not been performed.
2 2
Adherence to the foregoing protocol could be complicated by the
fact that inventors are becoming more willing to predict, and rely
upon, the results of unperformed (or prophetic) experiments in
their applications as technology advances.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion hopefully illustrated how the Fed-
eral Circuit's jurisprudence in three areas of patent law impacts
how a patent attorney practices law. Although, as discussed ear-
lier, some issues remain to be resolved by that court, the resulting
standardization of patent law as a result of the Federal Circuit's
commendable efforts has greatly benefited the quality of legal
practice in the field of patent law.
211 Id. at 1367-68; see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(p) (8th ed. 2001) ("Paper examples
should not be represented as work actually done. No results should be represented as actual
results unless they have been achieved. Paper examples should not be described using the past
tense.").
212 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
ExAMINING PROCEDURE § 6 08.01(p) (8th ed. 2001).
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